Abstract: This paper provides evidence that transatlantic commodity market integration began prior to the "first era of globalization" at the end of the nineteenth century. It does so by giving a long term perspective to the story of the development of an Atlantic Economy in wheat between the United States and Britain.
Introduction
The concept and consequences of globalization have recently enjoyed a vast amount of scholarly attention. In this literature economic historians have played a key role in demonstrating that globalization is not a new phenomenon, but rather something that has occurred in a series of waves, the first of which was in the nineteenth century (see for example O'Rourke & Williamson, 1999) .
Moreover, this body of research has been at pains to point out that the traditional indicators, such as volumes of trade in the case of commodity markets, are not sufficient when defining globalization.
Trade volumes have for example increased in earlier periods, such as with the discovery of the Americas by Europeans. Globalization is thus defined as commodity market integration, with the increase in trade merely a result of this.
Might economic historians be guilty of the same mistake, however, when choosing in which period to date the "first era of globalization"? Focus has naturally been directed at the late nineteenth century, when trade volumes boomed, and has concentrated primarily on the trade in wheat between the US and the UK. This trade took off at the end of the nineteenth century after a period of many decades of high protectionism. With very few exceptions, however, and despite this scholarly enthusiasm for the famous "Grain Invasion" of the late nineteenth century, very little attention has been paid to the trade in wheat between America and Britain going back even further to a time when volumes were relatively small: the eighteenth century.
3 And this despite the finding long ago by Shepherd & Walton (1972) that wheat and flour exports were of one of the major export commodities of the colonies, only exceeded in importance by tobacco.
Indeed, politicians and farmers of the mid-to late nineteenth century seem to have been under the impression that the importance of grain imports from North America started in their time, and economic historians seem to have been content to accept this (see for example O'Rourke & Williamson 1999) . That trade volumes were modest, however, does not mean that there was no globalization or commodity market integration. Moreover, although the levels of trade in wheat between the US and the UK were relatively small, they were in fact not insignificant for many years, meaning that market integration was certainly possible. The difficulty of looking for market integration in this period, is, however, that trade was continuously being cut off by various "exogenous" events, such as biological phenomena, war and politics. These correspond to those identified by O'Rourke (2006) who notes the possibility that market integration (globalization) might have started earlier if it had not been for the impact of such shocks 4 .
This paper considers the development of the trade in wheat between America and Britain from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century. No apology is made for the focus on just two countries and one commodity. Similar studies have formed the basis of our understanding of market integration in the late nineteenth century.
The pre-nineteenth century transatlantic grain trade has been almost completely neglected in the recent literature. It is in fact necessary to go back to the work of W. Freeman Galpin (1922 Galpin ( , 1925 to find otherwise. Galpin painstakingly establishes the importance of the American supply of grain for Britons at home and to British forces stationed in Spain and Portugal during the French and Napoleonic Wars. However, even he was under the impression that the "importance… of American grain in English history presented itself for the first time during the Napoleonic era". He does not, however, back his assertion up with any evidence.
Establishing that there was market integration in the eighteenth century requires a number of different steps. First, in section 2 the fact that there was a trade in grain between America and
Britain stretching back to the early years of the eighteenth century is established by looking at the available data on wheat imports from America to Britain from 1697 to 1899. This means that evidence for market integration cannot be dismissed as spurious. Comparing the level of imports with estimates of total wheat consumption in each year also helps motivate the study of this important trade. In section 3 the "exogenous" episodes which might be expected to impact on market integration are identified. These correspond to years of below-trend wheat trade as identified from the data presented in section 2 and are explained with reference to evidence mainly gathered from a number of primary sources. This section also demonstrates the importance attached by eighteenth century Britons to the supply of grain from America, a fact not recognized in recent work. Section 4 looks at the behaviour of prices over the period and tests for market integration.
Section 5 concludes.
The long grain invasion of Britain
The available data on wheat imports from the North American Colonies and the United States is illustrated in figure 1 , which covers the period from 1697, when the office of Inspector General of Imports and Exports was established, with the first imports of wheat from North America recorded in the 1720s. 5 . The data is plotted on a logarithmic scale in order to better illustrate the variability of imports in the period before the 1870s. Unfortunately, plotting the data in this way means that years with zero imports appear as missing observations. In fact, data is available for every year.
Of course, the levels of imports in the eighteenth century are tiny compared to later years.
However, population was also rather smaller, so in order to get an idea of the importance of these imports it is useful to compare the level of imports from America with total imports and estimates of total consumption of wheat in Britain.
Collins (1975) provides a number of estimates of annual wheat consumption per head in the nineteenth century, ranging from 6 to nearly 9 bushels. He also shows, however, that this was 5 The data from 1697-1787 is for wheat only and comes from BPP (1789 Mitchell & Deane (1953, pp. 8-9) it is possible to get an idea of the levels of consumption.
As figure 2 illustrates, even in the late 1700s imports from America were often supplying up to about three or four per cent of consumption. They were thus supplying a significant share of the population. Using data on total imports it is also possible to give an impression of the relative importance of US imports compared to those from other countries: for many years they were are a large proportion of total imports. The rest of the imports are predominantly coming from Prussia/"Germany", which for most years supplies in excess of half of all imports. The lesson is nevertheless clear: the United States' importance as a grain exporting country dates to the eighteenth century. There are, however, large fluctuations.
Explaining the fluctuations
It turns out that these fluctuations are surprisingly easy to explain. They are all the result of exogenous shocks to the developing Atlantic Economy, which in some cases cause imports to dwindle to a trickle for many years. It is convenient to divide this story into three periods: one until the 1760s and '70s, when Britain was a net exporter of wheat; the next from the industrial revolution and the accompanying population boom, which resulted in Britain becoming a net importer up until the end of the French and Napoleonic Wars; and finally from the introduction of Imports from America as % of total consumption Imports from others as % of total consumption extreme protectionism after 1815 until the abolition of the Corn Laws sliding scale in 1849. The period after the repeal of the Corn Laws, when American grain assumes its huge importance, which it maintains until the 1930s, is covered by Sharp (2007) .
Imports as a response to harvest failure: The period until 1773
It turns out that the sporadic imports of wheat in the first period are easily explained by harvest failure in Britain. This can be seen by comparing the years in which imports are present with the annual evidence on English harvests collected by Jones (1964) . So, for example, Jones records that 1728 and 1729 (the first years for which he collects evidence) were marked by "great dearth". And indeed, we find that American imports are first present in 1729. 1730 to 1739 was, however, a decade of "good harvests", and we find that American imports are entirely absent until 1740, following a "wet, late harvest" in 1739 and "extraordinary scarcity" in 1740. Jones then records that harvests were generally excellent until 1755, when the harvest was late, and 1756, "a year of scarcity". And of course we then find that imports from America appear in 1756 and 1757. The success of American exporters in these years provoked an embargo on "all American vessels laden with corn, flour, &c" in 1757 (Pitt 1792, p. 266) Harvests are then recorded as being good until 1766, 1767 and 1768 which were all marked by food riots. This resulted in an embargo on the exportation of corn from England. Imports from America were then again welcome (Pitt 1792, p. 368), indeed, an "Act for allowing the Importation of Wheat and Wheat-flour from His Majesty's Colonies in America, into this Kingdom, for a Time to be limited, free of Duty" was passed in 1766 (BPP 1766, p. 29) and was continued the following year (BPP 1767, p. 429).
Until this point we have learned nothing new: imports were largely the consequence of scarcity at home, a point well known from previous studies. However, it might be noted that American farmers were clearly looked to as a source of supply after a bad harvest, and were also obviously able to react. Every year there was a bad harvest the American colonies stepped in to help meet the deficit.
During this period, however, America was mostly seen as competition for British producers, and Britain was of course still at this time a net-exporter of grain. As early as 1713 a parliamentary committee heard of the quality of American wheat, superior to that Britain was able to export to the continent (BPP 1713, p. 368) and similar concerns were expressed in 1737 (BPP 1737, p. 116).
Already in 1740 a bill was read in parliament which proposed to prohibit the exportation of grain from North America, which met with condemnation by traders in the colonies themselves, as well as merchants involved in the trade in London (BPP 1740). In 1742, a petition was sent to Parliament "in Behalf… all the Farmers in Great-Britain" in which the petitioners made clear their fear that "great Quantities of Corn Land" were to be brought into production, and that wheat would be exported into Europe "at those Places, which always have been the British Farmers Markets", What is clear, however, is that the importance of American wheat during these years was only apparent during times of harvest failure and contemporary comment focussed for most years on the problems of competing with this supply for foreign markets.
The first era of free trade: 1773 to 1815
From the 1770s something changes however, perhaps not coincidentally at the same time as Britain industrialized, experienced a population boom and started to become a permanent net importer of wheat. 1771 and 1772 are recorded by Jones as being years of poor harvests, and American supply seems to respond in the usual way. Harvests are however recorded as being "fine" in 1773, unremarkable but not bad in 1774 and even "plentiful" in 1775, and yet these years see the beginning of large-scale imports from America. Although imports continue to fluctuate greatly after this date, there is no longer the clear correspondence between imports and scarcity that there was in the earlier period.
It is probably no coincidence that large volumes of American grain started in arrive in British ports after the enactment of the Corn Law of 1774, which ushered in a period of "practically free" trade in grain, as stated in a report of an 1821 Parliamentary Select Committee (BPP 1821, p. 15).
From 1791 the Corn Laws became more protectionist, but the onset of the French and Napoleonic Wars drove prices so high that only nominal duties were payable on imports (Sharp 2006) . The considerable swings in imports from the US we see during this period do, therefore, not seem to be principally related to trade policy. Neither can they be explained by harvest failure in the UK.
The sudden dearth of imports from America after 1775 is actually very easy to explain. First, there was the American War of Independence from 1775-1783 which of course had some impact on wheat and flour production in America. Hunter (2005) Perhaps more important, however, was the impact of the Hessian fly invasion from 1776 which decimated wheat crops. Unfortunately, I have been unable to locate data for wheat imports from America for the years 1787-1791. It is known, however, that in 1788 Philadelphia merchants were planning to ship large amounts of wheat to England, and that this resulted in a total ban on wheat imports from the United States from June 25 that year. How much this ban was attributable to a fear of introducing the fly to England and causing "a Calamity of much more extensive and fatal Consequences than the Admission of the Plague", and how much was due to an antagonism towards the newly independent United States is unclear, although Pauly (2002) notes that the Privy Council Committee for Trade were favourable towards ideas that would realign imperial trade and allow the Americans to suffer the consequences of independence. They also favoured policies that would stimulate home production at a time when higher general tariffs were not politically feasible. The recovery when it came, however, was quite impressive. Harvests in Europe were poor in 1799, but those of America were abundant and mostly free of the Hessian fly. Parliament enacted measures for bounties on the import of American wheat (Galpin 1925, p. 136) and by 1801 very large imports of American wheat came in. Indeed, in this year "the Americans so completely drained themselves of corn for this traffic, that bread became as dear, or dearer, at New York, than it was in England" (Board of Agriculture 1806, p. 277) . Despite this, a combination of good harvests in England and poor harvests in the US contributed to the low level of imports from the US in the following years.
The imposition of Napoleon's Continental System from late 1806 presented a great opportunity for American exporters, however, and contributed to the large volume of imports from the US in 1807, the year in which the US consul at Liverpool was led to declare that "such quantities of wheat and flour from the United States have lately poured into this market that prices have declined" 7 . This encouraged the belief "in the permanency of this seemingly inexhaustible granary" (Galpin 1925, p. 44) . However, in the wake of the Royal Navy's impressment of American citizens on the high seas, the United States itself imposed a trade embargo from 1807, reflected in testimony before a British parliamentary committee that trade in London declined in 1808 after the American embargo (Galpin 1922, p. 24) . However, illegal wheat exports continued and Napoleon 7 Quoted in Galpin (1922, p. 24) was quick to conclude that it was impossible to starve Britain, at least in part due to the availability of supplies from the United States. He thus soon, in the wake of bumper harvests in France, allowed exports of grain to resume (Galpin 1925, p. 168) . There is no doubt, however, that the years of the embargo and the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 were an important dampener on the level of trade (Galpin 1925, p. 147) . Although the available statistics do not discriminate between imports of wheat and imports of wheat flour, it seems that most imports during these years were in fact of flour, in contrast to the years before the onset of the French Wars, when imports of wheat were "very considerable" (BPP 1813, p. 115). This caused millers to complain, and evidence was presented before a select committee in 1813 from a miller to the effect that the imports of flour from the United States in 1806, 1807, 1809 and 1810 were bad for millers (BPP 1813, p. 99). Indeed, it seems they had good reason to. Select Committees heard that US flour was of very high quality owing to a sophisticated system of inspections and branding, and that it was easy to transport (BPP 1813, BPP 1814).
Prohibitive tariffs and the movement to free trade: 1815 to 1849
With peace, the Corn Laws soon became protectionist and this is reflected by the decline in American imports after 1818 (when prices fell sufficiently from wartime levels for imports to be prohibited under the terms of the Corn Law of 1815). Imports only really recovered with the introduction of the new Corn Law and the sliding scale of 1828 at which point swings in imports become clearly related to swings in import duties, which varied considerably from year to year (Sharp 2006) , although it might be noted that during the 1830s America was again suffering from attacks of the Hessian fly.
In general, however, these years see a gradual decline in interest in the supply from America. Corn sufficient for the Consumption of its Inhabitants" and relied on imports "chiefly from 9 Those there are concern rumours of small-scale smuggling of American grain via Canada (BPP 1820, pp. 18, 30 & 35; BPP 1821, pp. 277, 314-5 & 320-1; BPP 1836a, p. 43; BPP 1836b, pp. 113-4) and a brief mention that the Corn Laws harmed bilateral trade with the United States (BPP 1840). 10 There is also some evidence of its importance for other European countries, such as Portugal and Spain (Galpin 1922) and France (Kaplan 1976, p. 634) .
America" through the port of Bristol (BPP 1791b, p. 653 
The role of transportation costs
Until now no mention has been made of the role of transportation costs, which are often cited as being the main reason for the grain invasion of the late nineteenth century.
Recent research on the grain invasion of the late nineteenth century has concentrated on the role of falling domestic transportation costs, allowing grain to be shipped more easily from new production areas as the centre of American agriculture moved westward. However, the role of domestic transportation costs must have been negligible for the early days of the Atlantic wheat economy, since the vast majority of American wheat was grown near the east coast. Indeed, even as late as 1839, the geographic centre of production was east of Wheeling, (West) Virginia, with cultivation concentrated in Ohio and upstate New York and relatively little grown as far west as
Illinois (Olmstead & Rhode 2002, p. 936 ).
The evidence on transatlantic rates is sketchy, but intriguingly, it appears that freight rates were highest at the times when imports were greatest. For example, Douglass North's British import freight rate index, available from 1790, is highest in the years 1799-1801 and again in 1807, which correspond to years when imports from America were greatest. No "meaningful" freight index is available from 1808-1813, when "freights rose to very high levels", but even for these years historically significant levels of wheat imports were arriving from the United States for most years.
This pattern repeats itself in the figures North collected for the East Coast American freight factor for wheat, available from 1826. This is again highest from 1829-1831 and from 1845-47, the years of greatest imports 11 (North 1958) . Unless we are to believe that high transportation costs encouraged imports, then one possible alternative explanation is that the high volumes of imports were pushing up demand for shipping and increasing freight rates.
Some evidence on transatlantic costs of transporting wheat is available for the eighteenth century. For example, A Farmer (1773, p. 102) gives a detailed breakdown of the cost of transporting wheat from America, although some of his assumptions might be rather suspect 12 , since he is trying to show that British farmers have nothing to fear from imports. But by far the largest cost he records is for freight, which amounts to 8 shillings per quarter of wheat. By 1791, information received by the Committee of Privy Council for Trade suggested that it amounted to 8s.
11 He provides no data for the years 1839-1841, when imports were also high. 12 Such as that 10 per cent must be added to the cost due to waste and damage and an additional cost due to the decline in value because the grain has been on the ship for too long.
8d. (BPP 1791a). Dividing this by the price of wheat in Britain for each year gives freight factors of 15 and 17 per cent respectively, about the same as for most of the early nineteenth century and only marginally below that of the late nineteenth century, after the "transport revolution" (Sharp 2007 ).
Perhaps surprisingly, in evidence before a select committee in 1821, one witness describes the difficulty of Irish competing with American flour due to the cheapness of freight. It was actually cheaper to ship flour from America to Liverpool than from Ireland through Dublin to Liverpool, which required the use of expensive canal transport (BPP 1821, p. 319).
In short, it seems that at no time were transportation costs an important barrier to trade.
Indeed, this was the point made long ago by Ellis (1750) -as quoted above.
Looking for market integration
With the available statistical evidence we cannot hope to fulfil the stringent conditions for testing market integration described for example in Persson (2004) . There is no record of, for example, grain qualities, the only price information being for "wheat" in various markets. Nevertheless, when the available data are assembled, it does in fact seem possible to draw some meaningful conclusions. 1700  1710  1720  1730  1740  1750  1760  1770  1780  1790  1800  1810  1820  1830  1840  1850  1860  1870  1880  1890 1900 UK shillings / quarter Looking at figure 3 13 , the first thing that is striking is how the prices move together over the long run. The usual way of testing for long run market integration (or, more precisely, that the trading cost adjusted law of one price is valid) is to test for cointegration between the series (see for example Ejrnaes, Persson & Rich, 2008) .
Cointegration is tested for using Dynamic OLS (DOLS) by estimating the following model: 
where puk and pus are the logarithms to the UK and US prices respectively, t is the trend and t ε is the error term, which is assumed to be iid normally distributed. This estimation technique has the advantage, compared to the usual static Engle-Granger approach, that the model is well-specified (since it includes dynamic effects) so, given cointegration, t-ratios constructed from the standard errors follow standard normal distributions under the null.
Initially the model is estimated for the whole of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The estimation results and some model specification tests are given in appendix A1. It is clear that the model is not well specified, because the iid normality assumption for the residuals is not met. This is due to the presence of unmodelled events giving large residuals for the years 1704, 1714, 1715, 1727, 1741 and 1756. After introducing dummies for these years, the model is much better specified -see appendix A2. We can now solve for the static long-run solution of the model (the estimation is performed using PCGive) and check for cointegration. This is shown in appendix A3.
The coefficient to pus is 0.93, implying that US and UK prices almost perfectly follow each other in the long run. Moreover, the unit root t-statistic, which gives the test for the null of no cointegration, is -9.29 -and thus very strong evidence of cointegration.
In appendix A4, the sample has been restricted to the eighteenth century only, and as is to be expected the evidence for market integration is less strong. Nevertheless, the long-run coefficient to pus is still 0.78 and the unit root t-statistic is -7.81. The conclusion must be that prices were cointegrated and thus markets integrated in the eighteenth century -to a lesser extent than in the nineteenth century, but still convincingly so, especially in the light of the fact that this period includes many years before the trade in wheat really took off.
Another measure which is commonly referred to when assessing the degree of market integration is the price gap between the two markets. This is illustrated in figure 4 . 13 The data for Britain is taken from Mitchell & Deane (1953) and is the "Winchester" series until 1770, and thereafter the Gazette series. The American data is taken from Carter et al (2006) . Until 1783 the prices are taken from series Eg252 converted from Pennsylvania shillings to UK currency using the exchange rates given in series Eg318. No prices are available between 1776-83, and the price has thus assumed to be unchanging for these years. From 1784 the prices are in dollars per bushel from series Cc205-208 converted to British shillings per quarter using the exchange rates given in Officer (2008) . The missing exchange rates before 1791 are assumed to be the same as in 1791. In all cases, volumes are converted to imperial quarters using the fact that there are 8.256 American bushels to the imperial quarter. Looking more closely at the data, the times when trade is possible do indeed seem to be reflected in a narrowing of the price gap, most notably after the liberalization of trade in the 1770s, but even for shorter periods, such as around the extraordinary year of imports in 1807 and the short lived period of free trade immediately following the Napoleonic Wars. Thus, when trade was possible, there was a marked tendency of prices to respond in accordance with the law of one price.
To summarize, using one traditional measure of market integration, the degree of cointegration, markets were integrated. Looking at the price gaps adds another dimension, showing the importance of understanding exogenous events when looking at divergence from the law of one price. However, the data point to trade being quite possible throughout the eighteenth century, if it hadn't been for the various disruptions outlined in section 3.
Ideally, it would be possible to examine the speed of adjustment back to the law of one price equilibrium. However, the data are not frequent enough to allow for testing in the sense described by Ejrnaes et al (2008) . Clearly, however, when trade was relatively free, prices converged and levels of imports could reach those first experienced again half a century later.
Conclusion
The most important lesson from this paper is that, if we accept market integration as the appropriate definition of globalization, then it is necessary to look beyond the outcome variable -increasing levels of trade -when deciding when to date the first era of globalization.
Some degree of long run market integration was already present in the trade in wheat between the US and the UK from the eighteenth century. This trade was not insignificant, as the words and actions of contemporaries confirms. The change in the nineteenth century was not that prices began to follow each other, and neither was it particularly significant that the price gap narrowed (Persson 2004 ). The important change was that prices adjusted faster towards the law of one price equilibrium, as demonstrated by Ejrnaes et al (2008) . It is not possible to test for this with the eighteenth century data, but it is clear that trade was too sporadic for markets to develop sufficiently.
What is interesting, however, is that trade could and did increase during the periods when exogenous events did not preclude this from happening. Volumes could not feasibly have been as high as they were by the end of the nineteenth century (when the US was exporting more than she produced in total in the eighteenth century), but they were significant. And importantly this was without the transport revolution. Whether we call this globalization or not, it is an important precursor to the globalization story of the nineteenth century, and an illustration of the beginning of the story of the American grain invasion of Britain. 
